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By statute, a trust company organized pursuant to the provisions of Chapter
221 of the Wis. STAT. may act as an executor of an estate. Wis. STAT. (1941)
Sec. 223.03(7).
Objections which go to the temper, disposition, habits and moral character
of the nominee are not sufficient to render the named executor "legally incom-
petent." Nor will the fact that he may be obnoxious to the heirs justify the
court in refusing to nominate him. Saxe v. Saxe, 119 Wis. 557, 97 N.W. 187
(1903), cited in the principal case.
SYDNEY R. MERTZ.
Limitation of Actions-When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run in
Malp'ractice Actions Plaintiff, having sustained a spinal and back injury while
working in a rock quarry, went to the defendant doctor for treatment. The full
and complete history of the injury was given to the defendant who, the plain-
tiff alleges, was negligent in failing to make the proper examination and diag-
nosis necessary to ascertain the nature and extent of the injuries. Plaintiff
alleges that it was the doctor's duty to make a thorough examination of his
injury so as to determine the nature and extent thereof, and to use means gen-
erally and commonly employed by physicians and surgeons for the diagnosis
and treatment of such a case. Treatment, following the diagnosis of June 10,
1938, lasted until Aug. 15, 1938 at which date the plaintiff was transferred to a
hospital, his injuries having been aggravated by the defendant doctor's treat-
ment. Defendant demurred to plaintiff's petition for the reason that more than
two years had elapsed between June 10, 1938, the alleged date of the wrongrul
act or omission, and the filing of the petition. Demurrer was sustained by the
trial court. On appeal, held, judgment reversed. The statute of limitations in a
malpractice suit does not commence to run until treatment ends. In malpractice
cases there is difficulty in determining the exact moment when the act or om-
mission which caused the damage took place. The negligent act may occur at
some particular moment or may characterize the entire treatment. Since the
doctor's service is a continuing one of diagnosis and treatment throughout the
case, the physician must be given all reasonable time and opportunity to correct
the ordinary and usual mistakes even incident to skilled surgery; premature liti-
gation in order to save the rights of the patient in the event of substantial
malpractice, disrupts the mutual confidence that is highly essential to the rela-
tionship of doctor and patient. The treatment and employment should be con-
sidered as a whole, and, if malpractice occurs therein, the statute of limitations
should begin to run when the treatment ceases. Williams v. Elias, 1 N.W. (2d)
121 (Neb. 1941).
A majority of courts, especially in adjacent jurisdictions, have held that the
nature of the action of malpractice against a doctor requires the statute of limi-
tations to run from the date of termination of the treatment.
The Ohio court adopted the rule in Gillete v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 129, 65
N.E. 865 (1902). In that case the defendant doctor negligently left a surgical
sponge in the incision of an operation and when the wound failed to heal prop-
erly, treated the patient for a period of years in an attempt to cure the situation
although not removing the sponge. The court in ruling for the plaintiff held
that if the surgeon negligently closed the incision and left the sponge therein
and this condition is present when he abandons the case or otherwise retires
therefrom, the statute of limitations does not commence to run against the action
until treatment has been abandoned by the physician or otherwise terminated.
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Later the same court in Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1916)
held the relation of surgeon and patient grows out of a contract of employment
and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the contract is termi-
nated. The patient has a right to rely upon the surgeon to exercise reasonable
skill and care to restore health and may so rely until the contract of employ-
ment is at an end. The patient usually could not know how the initial trouble
occurred that resulted in the alleged mistreatment. Moreover it is clearly just
to the surgeon that he be not harassed by any premature litigation instituted in
order to save the rights of the patient in the event that there would be sub-
stantial malpractice. The surgeon should have all reasonable time and oppor-
tunity to correct the evils which made the treatment necessary.
The Minnesota court adopts the entire reasoning from the Bowers case in
Schmnitt v. Esser, 178 Minn. 82, 226 N.W. 196 (1929) where the defendant negli-
gently set the plaintiff's ankle and the plaintiff, relying upon the defendant's
statement that the case would take years to heal, did not learn of the fraud until
more than two years after the negligent setting. The court held that treatment
and employment should be considered as a whole, and, if malpractice occurred
therein, the statute of limitations begins to run when the treatment ceases.
It must clearly appear that the unskillful act which caused the injury took place
so long ago as to bar the action under the statute. See also Bush v. Cress, 227
N.W. 432 (Minn. 1929) and Schanil v. Branton, 181 Minn. 381, 232 N.W. 708
(1930).
In the case of DeHaan v. Winter, 258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932), the
court held in an action for malpractice for negligently setting a leg, that until
treatment of the fracture ceases, the relation of patient and physician continues
and the statute of limitations does not run. Where a sponge was negligently
left within the body of the patient and not removed until two and a half years
later it was held the cause of action accrued upon the removal of the sponge.
Plaintiff's cause of action accrued as much by reason of the alleged continuous
breach of duty on the part of the defendant in treating the plaintiff and in failing
to remove the sponge during that time as on the day of the operation. The
tort was a continuing one; so also was the cause of action. Sly v. Van Lengen,
198 N.Y.S. 608 (1923).
It has been held, however, that the statute of limitations begins to run at the
time of the act of malpractice and not from the date that the patient-physician
relationship is severed. Barnes v. Gardner, 9 N.Y.S. (2d) 785 (1939).
In Wetzel v. Pius, 78 Cal. App. 104, 248 Pac. 288 (1926) the plaintiff's cause
of action was barred because the negligent setting of the bone occurred over
one year previously. The court held that the action for malpractice of physician
sounds in tort, is classified as an action ex delicto and is not based on the
contract of employment. Subsequent acts which merely aggravate the damage
already done or later developments which frequently add new elements of
damage merely attach themselves to the original cause of action and do not of
themselves become independent causes of action, nor do they revive the original
cause of action if the same has become barred.
In a Connecticut case, the defendant negligently made a blood transfusion
whereby the plaintiff contracted syphilis. Plaintiff sued on this count and also on
a second count of breach of contract to cure him after he had contracted the
disease. The court held that an action for malpractice presents a claim of a
hybrid nature. In one aspect it may be viewed as based on negligence; in another
aspect as based on the breach of contract. The term malpractice itself may be
applied to a single act of physician or surgeon or to a course of treatment.
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RECENT DECISIONS
The statute begins to run when the breach of duty occurs. When the injury
is complete at the time of the act, the period commences to run at that time.
When however, the injurious consequences arise from a course of treatment,
the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the treatment is terminated.
Gianrbozi v. Peters, 16 Atl. (2d) 833 (Conn. 1940).
Where the treatment of the doctor continued in an attempt to cure burns
caused by negligent use of X-ray on the plaintiff, the statute was held to run
from the time of the X-ray treatment. McCoy v. Stevens, 182 Wash. 55, 44 Pac.
(2d) 797 (1935).
Negligence sufficient to give a cause of action may occur either in the
treatment of the patient's injury or in the preceding diagnosis. The Vermont
court explains this in Dominiz v. Pratt, 13 Atl. (2d) 198 (1940). The standard of
the degree of care and skill that is ordinarily possessed and exercised in like
cases by physicians in the same general line of practice who follow their pro-
fession in the same neighborhood applys not only to physical treatment of the
patient's injury but as well to his diagnosis of the malady and hence negligence
may exist in a failure to apply a proper remedy upon correct determination of
existing physical conditions or it may precede that and result from a failure
properly to inform himself of these conditions. Wisconsin follows the rule that
malpractice may consist in a lack of skill or care in diagnosis as well as in
treatment. Kitechler v. Volgmann, 180 Wis. 238, 192 N.W. 1015 (1923) ; Jaeger v.
Stratton, 170 Wis. 579, 176 N.W. 61 (1920).
In Lottin v. O'Brien, 146 Wis. 258, 131 N.W. 361 (1911), where the last
treatment of the patient was over one year before the suit was started, the
Wisconsin court held the mere fact that there was no discharge of the defendant
on that day would not prevent the statute from running. The statute of limita-
tions began to run when the cause of action accrued and this accrued when the
negligent acts were committed without reference to discharge. The negligent
omission to discover the improper setting occurred at such dates and times as
the defendant undertook to examine, treat, and care for the disabled arm. If
there was negligence in treating the arm after negligently setting of the bones,
this latter negligence occurred not later than the date when treatments by the
defendant ceased. The fact that there was no official discharge of the patient
was considered immaterial.
The Minnesota court, in deciding that the statute of limitations begins to
run at the end of treatments, commented on language used in the Lotten case,
supra, as follows: "This language appears to express the thought that, so long
as the doctor continues the treatment so unskillfully and negligently that he
fails to discover the condition brought about by a prior unskillful and negligent
act, he is not in a position to urge that the statute of limitations has started to
run." Schmlitt v. Esser, 193 Minn. 354, 226 N.W. 196 (1929).
RALPH J. STRANDBERG.
Municipal Corporations-Liability of Municipality for Defects in Side-
walks and Streets.-The defendant, Hosmer, obtained access to the basement
of. his building by means of a trapdoor on the sidewalk. The hinges of the
trapdoor were about inches high. In the sidewalk, about a foot and a half
from the trapdoor, there was a crack which led into the center expansion joint
of the walk, and which had broken away forming an irregular hole, triangular
in shape. The hole, was about 11 inches long and 3 inches wide at one end, and
tapered to a blunt point at the other end. Its depth was about one inch at the
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